This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals' behaviors and inferences, and how they interact with material incentives. It then characterizes optimal incentive-setting in the presence of norms, deriving in particular appropriately modified versions of Pigou and Ramsey taxation.
Introduction
To foster desired behaviors, economists emphasize (with a number of caveats) material incentives provided through contracts, markets or policy. While these often work very e¤ectively, there also many puzzling cases where incentives fail to have the desired e¤ects (e.g., crowding out) or, conversely minor ones have a disproportionately large impact (crowding in, shift in norms). 1 Societies also sometimes "insist" on what seem like ine¢ ciently costly forms of incentives (e.g., prison rather than …nes or reparations) or renounce others that might be quite cheap or e¤ective (paying for organ donations, corporal punishments, public shaming).
Rather than incentives, psychologists emphasize persuasion and social in ‡uence, in particular through manipulations of collective identity, peer comparison and other interventions aimed at changing the "social meaning"of actions and shifting the norms that prevail in a population. 2 This body of work o¤ers many valuable insights and a wide knowledge base of experimental regularities, but no clear analytical framework.
Legal scholars, …nally, certainly agree on the importance of incentives, but many argue that the law is not merely a price system for bad and good behaviors -it also plays an important role in expressing and shaping the values of society. The spectrum of opinions ranges from pure "consequentialists"to pure "expressivists", but here also the underlying architecture -exactly how laws do or should convey societal values-remains elusive. Thus, the expressive content of law is sometimes invoked to call for harsher measures and sometimes for more lenient ones, or appealed to both for and against a given form of punishment.
These apparently disjoint approaches are in fact highly complementary and can be fruitfully brought together to shed new light on the determinants of compliance and the e¤ects of incentives.
To this e¤ect, we develop in this paper a unifying framework to analyze how private decisions as well as public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values") , material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms").
We …rst show how honor, stigma and social norms -a social multiplier, more generally-arise from individuals'behaviors and inferences, and when they are strengthened or undermined by the presence of material incentives. We then characterize optimal incentive-setting in the presence of norms, deriving appropriately modi…ed versions of Pigou and Ramsey taxation that correct not just for standard externalities but also for the zero-sum aspect of image-seeking. In particular, this "reputation tax" makes the optimal incentive depend, nonmonotonically, on aggregate shifts in costs or preferences that a¤ect the overall rate of compliance. For well-behaved (unimodal) distributions of individual values, the subsidy is lowest for behaviors with very high or very low participation rates (as these respectively induce maximal stigma and maximal honor), and highest 1 Examples of such puzzles include e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini [2000a,b] , Fehr and Gächter [2001] , Knez and Simester [2001] , Fehr and Falk [2002] , Fehr and Rockenbach [2003] , Falk and Kosfeld [2006] , Karlan and List [2007] , Ariely et al. [2009] , Panagopoulos [2009] , Funk [2010] and Fryer [2010] . See, e.g., Bowles [2008] and Bowles and Reyes [2009] for recent surveys of the empirical puzzles, and Gibbons [1997] and Prendergast [1999] for the more "classical" literature on incentives in organizations.
2 See, e.g., Cialdini [1984] , Cialdini et al. [2006] , Prentice and Miller (1993) , or Schultz et al. [2007] .
1 for behaviors in the "grey zone"where compliance and noncompliance are both common behaviors (and social pressure is thus at its weakest).
Next, we incorporate into the model the idea that the distribution of preferences in society may be only imperfectly known by agents. Allowing for such aggregate uncertainty, in addition to the individual heterogeneity standard in signaling models, opens up to analysis a number of ideas and practices found mostly outside economics, but closely linked to the study of incentives.
The …rst is social psychologists'practice of "norms-based interventions", namely campaigns and messages that seek to alter people's perceptions of what constitutes "normal" behavior (or values) among their peers. We make clear how such interventions operate, but also how their e¤ectiveness is limited by a credibility problem, particularly when the "descriptive" and "injunctive'norms (what most people do, versus what most approve of) are in con ‡ict.
The next and central question we analyze is the expressive role of law. Whether intended to foster the common good or more narrow objectives, laws and other policies re ‡ect the knowledge that decision-makers have about societal preferences. These same "community standards"are also what shapes social norms (conferring esteem or stigma) and moral sentiments (pride and shame).
Thus, imposing a heavy sentence for some o¤ense or a zero price on certain transactions means both setting material incentives and sending a message about society's values, and hence about the norms according to which di¤erent behaviors are likely to be judged. The analysis, combining an informed principal with individually signaling agents, makes precise the notion of expressive law, determining in particular when a weakening or a strengthening of incentives is called for.
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer turns out to be entirely independent of whether individual behaviors are complements (the usual understanding of a norm) or substitutes (search for distinction). Instead, it hinges on what speci…c variable the law signals -agents'general willingness to contribute to the public good, or the value to society of such contributions. The underlying intuition, and the main thread running through our analysis, is that the principal can use multiple "currencies" to shape agents' behavior. In the empirically relevant case where rewards and punishments are costly to implement, he will seek to economize on them by harnessing agents'
other sources of motivation -intrinsic and reputational. Thus, when better informed about prevailing standards of behavior, he tries to signal that social sanctions or payo¤s are large by lowering extrinsic incentives, at some cost in compliance. In contrast, when the asymmetric information concerns the magnitude of the externalities that agents impose on each other (and provided that they care more, the larger their social impact), the principal seeks to enhance their intrinsic motivation by convincing them that the externalities are large, and this now involves setting higher incentives than under symmetric information.
Pushing further this logic, we extend the model to also shed light on why societies are often resistant to economists'messages about the virtues of incentives, as well as on why they forego certain policies, such as "cruel and unusual" punishments, irrespective of e¤ectiveness considerations, in order to express their being "civilized".
Related literature. The need for an integrated analysis of law and social norms is stressed, among others, by Ellickson [1998] , Lessig [1998] and McAdams and Rasmusen [2007] , who provide an excellent survey. The expressive role of law is emphasized in particular by Sunstein [1996] , Kahan [1997] , Cooter [1998] , Posner [1998 Posner [ , 2000a and McAdams [1999] . Our signaling formalization is most closely related to the approach advocated by the last two authors. 3 Recent experimental evidence on the expressive e¤ect of incentives is provided by Tyran and Feld [2006] , Galbiati and Vertova [2008] , Galbiati et al. [2010] and Bremzeny et al. [2011] .
The interaction of incentives with other forms of motivation under symmetric information is studied by, among others, Frey [1997] , Brekke and Nyborg [2003] , Besley and Ghatak [2005] and Bénabou and Tirole [2006a] , and we start by extending the model of prosocial behavior developed in this last paper to new settings (distributions of preferences, distortive taxation) and results. Kaplow and Shavell [2007] consider a social planner who, instead of incentives, has access to a costly "inculcation" technology for feelings of guilt and virtue (acting respectively as a tax and a subsidy) and characterize the optimal mix of these two instruments. Fischer and Huddart [2008] study the impact of incentives when agents engage in both desirable and undesirable behaviors (e.g., performance falsi…cation) which the principal cannot tell apart, but which are subject to separate social norms among agents, giving rise to di¤erent social multipliers.
The informed-principal problem that arises with expressive law bears some relationship to those in Bénabou and Tirole [2003] , Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] and Herold [2010] , but with the important di¤erence that what agents now try to infer -the prevailing social standard-embodies everyone's equilibrium actions and beliefs. The idea that incentives convey information about the distribution of preferences is shared with Sliwka [2008] and van der , but the nature of normative in ‡uences is quite di¤erent. In the …rst paper, social complementarities operate through "conformist" types, whose preference is to mimic whatever action the majority chooses. In the second they involve "reciprocal altruists", whose taste for contributing to a public good rises with total contributions. Our model has no built-in complementarity; conformity or distinction e¤ects
arise endogenously, and we analyze expressive law in both cases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the model and basic results concerning honor, stigma, and the social multiplier. Section 2 characterizes optimal incentives under common knowledge about societal values. Section 3 takes up norms-based interventions and Section 4 analyzes the expressive role of law. Section 5 discusses robustness, while Section 6 concludes with directions for further research.
1 Model
Basic framework
Agents. A continuum of agents each choose some discrete action a 2 f0; 1g; with resource cost (time, e¤ort, etc.) ca; c > 0: Each also receives from some principal an incentive of ya: In a …rm or organization, a represents working rather than shirking, abstaining from opportunism, etc., and y a wage rate or performance-contingent bonus. In a public-goods context a is some prosocial action such as not polluting, voting, contributing, etc., with y representing a subsidy on the provision of the public good or, conversely, a penalty (tax, …ne, prison) on undesirable behaviors (i.e., on a).
To represent agent's preferences we use the simplest speci…cation that encompasses the three key ingredients of intrinsic motivation, extrinsic incentives and (social or self) esteem concerns:
We refer to v as the agent's intrinsic motivation. In a …rm or organization it corresponds to liking and motivation for the task (sales, research), work ethic, etc. In a public-goods context, it represents the agent's degree of altruism or prosocial orientation, whether general or activity-speci…c (e.g., concern for the environment); each agent then also derives a bene…t e (for "externality") from the aggregate supply, a: 4; 5
Decisions also carry reputational costs and bene…ts, re ‡ecting the judgements and reactions of others as they assess an agent's intrinsic motivation, which is private information, in light of his actions. These concerns, represented by the last term in (1), can be purely hedonic (valuing social esteem per se) or instrumental. 6 Thus, in a labor-market, career concerns make it valuable to be seen by employers as having a strong work ethic, caring about the activity in question, etc. In the social sphere, people perceived as generous, public minded, good citizens, etc., are more likely to be chosen as mates, friends, or leaders. Reputational payo¤s can also be reinterpreted as the value of self-image or moral sentiments, with each individual judging his "true character" by his own conduct: self-signaling works much like social signaling, with memorability or salience substituting 4 It does not matter at this stage whether v re ‡ects, in Andreoni's [1989] terminology: (i) pure altruism, meaning that the agent values his actual contribution to others' welfare via his impact on a; and requiring group size to be small (in this case the v's are linked to e; see Section 4.3); (ii) impure altruism, arising from a "joy of giving" (social and self esteem are accounted for separately in (1)) or re ‡ecting "Kantian"-type reasonings in which the agent overscales his real impact on a (e.g., Brekke et al. [2003] ). On intrinsic motivation in …rms or organizations, see also Besley and Ghatak [2005] .
5 One can easily allow for a di¤erential impact of a across agents, but focussing on its average value is su¢ cient for most purposes. Also for simplicity, we abstract from decreasing or increasing returns in the value of a:
6 The evidence supporting the role of reputational concerns is extensive; see footnote 24 for some examples, based on manipulations of the act's visibility. On the modeling side, value functions derived from an explicit second-stage game may not be linear (e.g, Rotemberg [2008] ), or may involve weights that vary with the agent's type. The reduced-form speci…cation (1) greatly simpli…es the analysis, while capturing key e¤ects also present in more complicated cases. One can also relax it substantially, as discussed in Section 5.
for external visibility. 7
To analyze most transparently the interplay of individual and aggregate uncertainty over agents' preferences we focus on a single source of heterogeneity, namely intrinsic motivation. Thus all share the same marginal valuation for money or other extrinsic incentives y, which is normalized to 1; they also care equally about social (or self) esteem, as re ‡ected by a common : 8
Principal. Agents face a principal who sets the incentive y -wage, tax or subsidy, sentence, etc. This is "the law", whether that of the company or that of the land. 9 The principal may also be able to communicate with agents directly, whether by disclosing hard information or through cheap talk. 10 We focus the exposition on the case of a planner who maximizes social welfare
where U is the sum, in equilibrium, of all agents utilities'de…ned in (1), a their total contribution and 0 the shadow cost of funds or other resources used as incentives -deadweight loss from taxes, enforcement costs, etc. This focus is without loss of generality, as a simple renormalization maps the objective function of less benevolent or even purely sel…sh principals into (2). 11
1.2 The calculus of esteem and the social multiplier Bénabou and Tirole [2004, 2011] 8 The speci…cation (1) is thus a special case of the more general model (Bénabou and Tirole [a] )
in which: (i) the action a can be discrete or continuous; (ii) agents can also have di¤erent marginal utilities of money vy; (iii) it may be undesirable to be perceived as greedy or needy, as re ‡ected in the last term; (iv) agents'reputational concerns can also di¤er, so that a type is a quadruplet (va; vy; a ; y ): At least two-dimensional heterogeneity is required to generate a negative response to incentives (net crowding out), as well a related "overjusti…cation e¤ect" of publicity. We shall be abstracting here from these phenomena, to better focus on new ones, arising in particular from aggregate uncertainty. 9 We assume costless observation of behaviors by the principal and a well-understood notion of what constitutes a good or bad action. Shavell (2002) argues that transaction costs and better local knowledge of situational factors can make social norms preferable to legal enforcement. See also Fisher and Hudddart (2008) for a model with norms and an informationally constrained principal.
1 0 Another policy tool can be for the principal to a¤ect the public visibility or memorability of agents'actions, thus scaling the reputational weight (more generally, all the ( a ; y )'s in footnote 8), by a factor x 0; at some cost (x): Similarly, laws and public campaigns can also in ‡uence behavior by causing people to pay more attention to their actions and the image they will project. On the bene…ts and costs of visibility-based policies, see Prat [2005] , Bénabou and Tirole [2006a] , Daughety and Reinganum [2009] , Bar-Isaac [2009] and Ali and Bénabou [2010] .
1 1 Let W = U + [B (1 + )y] a; where 0 1 and B represents any private bene…ts derived from agents' participation or e¤ort. For the planner, = 1 and B = 0; while a …rm sel…shly maximizing pro…ts has = 0 < B: Imperfectly benevolent principals -government agency, NGO, church, etc.-fall in- 
mean v:
We also de…ne two important conditional moments and their di¤erence:
Given y; an agent chooses
cuto¤ rule. Conversely, in an interior equilibrium (on which we shall focus for simplicity),the two conditional expectations are given by M + (v ); which governs the "honor" conferred by participation, and M (v ), which governs the "stigma"from abstention. In the self-image interpretation of the model, M + (v ) and M (v ) correspond to virtue and guilt.
The net reputational incentive is (v ); and the cuto¤ v solves the …xed-point equation 12
The social multiplier. When more people "do the right thing", or are thought to do so, does the pressure on individuals to also choose a = 1 rise or fall? As v decreases (see Figure 1a ), honor declines but stigma worsens, since both M + and M are increasing functions. Depending on which e¤ect dominates, the net social or moral pressure (v ) can decrease or increase. In the …rst case, 0 (v ) > 0 and decisions are (locally) strategic substitutes. In the latter case, 0 (v ) < 0; they are (locally) strategic complements, which corresponds to the usual de…nition of a norm. If complementarity is strong enough and high enough, there can be multiple equilibria -that is, self-sustaining norms. In this paper, however, we ensure uniqueness by imposing 1 + 0 (v) > 0;
which holds for not too large. 13 The slope of aggregate supply a(y) = 1 G(v (y)) is then g(v )
1 2 An interior equilibrium will be ensured by assuming (or, later on, ensuring that the optimal y satis…es) (1 )vmin + v < c y < (1 + )vmax v; together with the condition stated below for monotonicity of v + (v): 1 3 The fact that j 0 j is bounded is shown in the Appendix. Bénabou and Tirole [2006a] provide su¢ cient conditions and explicit examples for the case of multiplicity, 1 + 0 < 0: Previous signaling models with a continuum of types and potentially multiple equilibria include Bernheim [1994] and Rasmusen [1996] . For a model with complementarities between non-reputational norms and incentives, see Weibull and Villa [2005] . times the social multiplier,
Intuition suggests that honor concerns will dominate when people who "do the right thing"
(a = 1) are fairly rare, and stigma considerations prevail when only a few "deviants"fail to comply. This is only true, however, under appropriate restrictions on the distribution of agents'preferences.
Lemma 1 (Jewitt 2004 ) If g is everywhere decreasing (increasing), then is everywhere increasing (decreasing). If g has a unique interior maximum, then has a unique interior minimum.
We focus on the second case, which is more general as it allows for both strategic substitutability and complementarity; see Figure 1b . For technical reasons, we impose on a slightly stronger version of the quasiconcavity in (2), by assuming that it is strictly decreasing everywhere to the left of its minimum, and strictly increasing everywhere to the right. Note that this minimum does not coincide (generically) with the mode of g:
For concreteness, we shall refer to the "desired" behavior a = 1 as being (in equilibrium):
-"Respectable" or "normal", if v is in the lower tail, for instance because the cost c is low.
These are things that "everyone but the worst people do", such as not abusing one's spouse and children, and which are consequently normative, in the usual sense that the pressure to conform rises with their prevalence.
-"Admirable" or "heroic", if v is in the upper tail, for instance because the cost c is very high.
These are actions that "only the best do", such as donating a kidney to a stranger or risking one's life to rescue others.
-"Modal"if v in the middle range around the minimum of : Both a = 1 and a = 0 are then common behaviors, leading to weak inferences about agent's types. 14 It is worth noting that the model generates endogenously the two types of signaling motives which, in the previous literature, were taken as alternative assumptions: a desire to signal conformity (e.g., Bernheim [1994] ), and a desire to signal distinction (e.g., Pesendorfer [1995] Incentives are much more e¤ective (multiplier exceeding 1) for respectable behaviors, such as tax compliance, as they are ampli…ed by the dynamics of stigma (partial crowding in). Where net costs 1 4 Other factors a¤ecting the relative strength of honor and stigma include nonlinearities in reputational payo¤s, E ['(v) j a] (e.g., Corneo [1997] ) and di¤erential visibility of good and bad deeds (Bénabou and Tirole [2006a] ).
1 5 See also Brennan and Brooks [2007] , who do not formulate a signaling model but postulate, based on intuition, that the interplay of esteem and disesteem should lead to a net reputational value that is U-shaped with respect to the rate of compliance. We prove such a result, which holds provided the distribution of types is well behaved (unimodal).
1 6 Full crowding out (a negative supply response to incentives, or multiplier) requires multidimensional heterogeneity, as described in footnote 8. This phenomenon was investigated elsewhere and is therefore not our focus here.
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are not too high (a moderately low v ) and actions easily observable (a high ); small variations in incentives can induce large changes in aggregate behavior. 17 Shifts in societal preferences. A key focus of the paper are situations in which there may be aggregate shifts in the distribution of agents'preferences. For any 2 R; let
be the original distribution shifted to the right by ; with density g (v) = g(v ) and hazard rate h de…ned similarly. We assume from here on that individuals'private valuations are distributed
where "community standards" may be known or a priori uncertain. Conditionally on ; the reputational return to choosing a = 1 is easily seen to be (v) (v ): Without loss of generality we normalize the v's (adding a constant) so that the minimum of occurs at v = 0; and that of therefore at v = : To insure that the equilibrium cuto¤ is always interior (and, a bit more strictly, participation bounded away from 0 and 1), we then restrict the model's parameters to satisfy 
A known shift in societal preferences therefore has the same e¤ ect on (equilibrium) social norms (v (y)) and aggregate behavior a (y) as an increase in material incentives y of the same magnitude. This equivalence already suggests that, for a principal, communicating about community standards, or a …rm's "culture", can be an attractive substitute to costly rewards and punishments -provided he can achieve credibility.
1 7 A good example is Ireland's 33c / tax on plastic bags (instituted in conjunction with an awareness campaign): "Within weeks, plastic bag use dropped 94%. Within a year, nearly everyone had bought reusable cloth bags, keeping them in o¢ ces and in the backs of cars. Plastic bags were not outlawed, but carrying them became socially unacceptable -on a par with wearing a fur coat or not cleaning up after one's dog." (Rosenthal [2008] ). Other examples include Continental Airlines'$50 bonus program based on company-wide performance (Knez and Simester [2001] ) and the impact on voting turnout of (removing) "symbolic" …nes for non-voters in Switzerland (Funk [2007] ).
1 8 Condition (8) means that it is socially ine¢ cient (respectively, e¢ cient) for the least (most) motivated agent, with types close to vmin + (close to vmax + ) to contribute. It will imply that for y close to the …rst-best optimum (which delivers v = c e), the cuto¤ remains interior (i.e., the condition given in footnote 12 is satis…ed).
2 Optimal incentives with norms: symmetric information
Consider the problem of a social planner who sets the incentive y to maximize total welfare, W = U (1 + )y a. Each individual who contributes, at a cost of c; values doing so at v and additionally generates an external bene…t e for society. He also receives y, but this costs (1 + )y to provide, where 0 is the shadow cost of public funds. Finally, the contributor reaps the reputational bene…t (v ) but, image being a zero-sum game (or "positional good"), in ‡icts an equivalent reputational loss on non-contributors. 19 Thus, social welfare is equal to
In all that follows we assume this objective function to be strictly quasiconcave in y; for all ; such is the case provided is small enough. The optimal incentive is then given as the solution to
The interpretation is familiar from Ramsey taxation: the net social marginal bene…t of raising y by one dollar (inducing da = ( @v =@y) g new agents to participate) is equated to the deadweight loss from paying the extra subsidy to all inframarginal agents. 20 The condition can also be rewritten so as to make clear role of the social multiplier in the participation response,
The …rst-best case of no distortion will prove to be an important benchmark under both symmetric and asymmetric information. With = 0; (12) simpli…es to e + v (y F B ( )) = c; which is the standard Samuelson condition equating the total social bene…t and cost of a marginal contribution.
Proposition 1 (modi…ed Pigou) The …rst-best (symmetric information, = 0) incentive is
When g is strictly unimodal in v; y F B is single-peaked with respect to and c; and maximized at 0 c e:
Computing agents'average utility U ; esteem and stigma sum up to
If reputational payo¤s are nonlinear, or if varies with v; signaling can be a positive or negative-sum game, depending in particular on the curvature of probability functionals. The linear case serves as a natural and important benchmark, and also avoids "philosophical"debates on whether or not esteem and stigma, or pride and shame, should be counted as part of social welfare.
2 0 De…ning the elasticity " (y) ya 0 (y)=a (y), (12) can be rewritten in the Lerner-Ramsey form (ê y) =y = ( =1 + ) (1=" (y)) ; whereê (e )=(1 + ) is the net externality, scaled in monetary units.
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One must subtract from the standard Pigovian subsidy; e; the reputational rent extracted by a marginal contributor from the rest of society. Otherwise choosing a = 1 would be overcompensated, and conversely noncompliers would su¤er an excessive "double whammy". This reputation tax makes y F B dependent, in a nonmonotonic way, on and c; see the top curve in Figure 2 . When is low or c high, most people do not contribute, so the few who do reap signi…cant honor. Conversely, when is high relative to c, the few "bad apples" who fail to participate incur strong stigma. At both ends there is thus a strong reputational incentive, making a low y optimal. When is close to 0 ; on the other hand, social pressure is at its weakest -contributing and abstaining are both common-requiring higher incentives. 21
Implications.
(i) The tax deduction rate for charitable donations should be lower than the standard Pigovian level and, most importantly, vary inversely with the publicity or image value inherent to the gift.
While implementing such a scheme in practice may not be easy, there are, for instance, well established "market prices"for naming rights to a university or hospital building, an endowed chair, etc. Similarly, agencies rating corporations on their social responsibility could aim to incorporate a "publicity discount" in their scores. Indeed, the purpose of such evaluations is to measure true contributions to social welfare and even, through the response of some market participants, reward or punish corporations accordingly. 22 (ii) Similar distortions toward the more visible (high ) occur on the consumer side: the premium paid for "fair trade" or "green" products also buys social and self image, the ‡ip side of which is the stigma (or bad conscience) shifted to others. As a result, too many dollars likely ‡ow toward hybrid cars and solar panels relative to housing insulation and e¢ cient furnaces (Ariely [2008] ), or toward free-trade co¤ee compared to food kitchens.
(iii) Consider a new environment-friendly technology that di¤uses more widely as its cost c falls, due to technological progress. The optimal subsidy rate should …rst rise, then fall over time.
In general, y F B could be positive or negative (taxing image-seeking behaviors with low or negative social value). We shall assume from now on that
2 1 This result has interesting parallels with Kaplow and Shavell [2007] , who relate the optimal use of guilt and virtue to the frequency of good or bad behavior. In their model, society has a costly "inculcation" technology for feelings of guilt and virtue, which can be manipulated separately. In our model, guilt and virtue (M and M + ) arise in equilibrium from everyone's actions and inferences. This makes them interdependent, and vary with ("control for") the level of material incentives. The principal also has more limited ways of a¤ecting these feelings (or social payo¤s): publicity x (which ampli…es them), or incentives y and messages about some society-wide variable ( or e), both of which alter equilibrium inferences. Turning back now to the more realistic second-best case where > 0; but still with full information about ; (12) implies
The social bene…t from the marginal contribution exceeds its social cost, implying that y SI ( ) < y F B ( ); see Figure 3 , middle curve. Showing these results rigorously, however, requires solving a system of implicit equations ( (5) and (12)) in y SI ( ) and v that can have singularity points. By excluding some (arbitrarily small) interval around 0 = c e and restricting attention to values of that are not too large, however, we can show:
Proposition 2 (modi…ed Ramsey) Let ( 1 ; 2 ) be any subinterval of not containing 0: For all below some > 0 :
(i) The symmetric-information policy y SI ( ) is uniquely de…ned on ( 1 ; 2 ) by (12) and it satis…es
Compliance is thus lower than in the …rst-best case.
(ii) The function y SI ( ) is strictly increasing in when 2 < 0 ; and strictly decreasing when
These results demonstrate the robustness of the insights from the …rst-best case -reputation tax and bell-shape of the optimal policy. Where the shadow cost (economic, political) of providing material incentives is high, however, compliance will fall substantially short of the …rst best. 23 In such cases, other instruments may be more e¤ective.
Persuasion and norms-based interventions
Empirical evidence. While straight public appeals to good citizenship or generosity sometimes work fairly well (e.g., Reiss and White [2008] a smiley face if they were below average, a frowning one if they were above. The "descriptive" condition (i) led to a convergence toward the mean: high-consuming households adjusted down but low-consuming ones adjusted up. In the "descriptive + prescriptive" condition (ii), the latter e¤ect disappeared, leading to a reduction in total consumption. Several electricity districts have now adopted similar programs on a much larger scale. Ayres et al. [2010] study those of Sacramento and Puget Sound (each with samples sizes of about 85; 000); implementing on consumers' monthly statements a scheme broadly similar to (ii) led to a rapid and lasting reduction in average consumption, of about 2:5%:
Psychologists'view of how such interventions work is that: (i) people care strongly about social comparisons and self approval, and judge what "one should do" by what they believe others do, or approve of (that is, 0 < 0 , generating complementarity); (ii) they often misperceive the norm.
First, there is some dispersion in individual perceptions, which we shall relate to the convergence e¤ect. Most importantly, there can be an aggregate misperception, termed pluralistic ignorance (e.g., Prentice [1994a, 1994b] ). People may have incorrect beliefs about how others generally behave or assess their peers, or they may not properly account for the extent to which others are also conforming to a commonly (mis)perceived norm. 25 Dispelling excessive pessimism can then (for 0 < 0) bring about a large and bene…cial shift in collective behavior, as found for instance by Prentice and Schroeder [1998] in the context of student drinking. 26 Where pluralistic ignorance takes the form of excessive optimism about others' conduct or values, however, the truth will further damage compliance. For instance, in the case of pornography -which in US law is explicitly judged according to "community standards"-there is de…nite evidence that actual use vastly exceeds what people think. 27 The same is likely true of drug use, and possibly of racist and sexist attitudes. In an experiment on tax evasion and welfare fraud in three European countries, Lefebvre et al. [2011] …nd that revealing previous instances of low average compliance increases evasion. 28 The literature's standard recommendation is to use the descriptive norm (or both) if most people behave well relative to general expectations, but if they behave badly use only the prescriptive norm. There is, however a problem of long-run credibility (or legitimacy; Tyler [1990] , Xiao [2010] ), as the principal -experimenter, NGO, policymaker-…nds himself in the position of selectively disclosing and framing good behaviors, eluding or minimizing depressing truths, and relying on "soft" statements about what people declare they approve of, while doing the opposite. 29
Formalizing norms-based interventions. Descriptive interventions correspond to communicating with agents about the average a, which in turn re ‡ects some preference parameter like that they are imperfectly informed about. Prescriptive interventions, from public campaigns to individualized "smiley faces", can be understood as communicating about e ("people are strongly a¤ected by this problem") or especially about ("people make strong judgments based on this behavior"), which boosts social pressure both directly and, for respectable acts, indirectly:
As we show below, however, even a fully benevolent principal will always try to exaggerate or selectively disclose positive information about a; ; e or : Agents, conversely, will discount such cheap talk, a fortiori when the "norms entrepreneur" could be deriving private bene…ts from their compliance.
Let agents be only imperfectly informed about current "community standards", namely the overall behavior of the population against which theirs will be judged. Indeed, these shift with the underlying distribution of preferences in society, ; which is hard for an individual to observe. 30
Agents'prior belief about is that it lies in some interval The principal cannot or does not vary incentives (laws with expressive content will be studied later on), so y is …xed, -possibly at zero, or more generally at a low enough level that
This condition, reducing to (14) when y = 0; ensures that greater participation always raises social welfare. 32 We assume (as a simpli…cation) that agents'social payo¤s are based on long-run reputations, namely those that will be assigned to contributors and non-contributors after becomes publicly known (which ultimately happens with probability 1) -for instance, after everyone has had time to observe average compliance, a: An agent's action choice is then based on his expectation of those "…nal"reputation payo¤s conditionally on his own v; which is informative about since it is drawn
We restrict attention to equilibria in which each agent's optimal strategy is a cuto¤ v F (y);
given that others follow the same rule. 33 In such an equilibrium, the expected reputational return
We also focus on respectable behaviors, meaning that the support of lies to the right of 0 = c e: Strategic complementarity is indeed the relevant case for most existing norm-based interventions, which typically involve relatively low-cost behaviors (e.g., energy conservation).
Non-strategic revelation. We …rst investigate what occurs when the principal cannot prevent the information from leaking, or it is exogenously revealed by some third party -media, academics, watchdogs, etc. De…ne, for all v 2 V and distribution F describing agents'prior beliefs about ; the operator
Since a higher v and a lower F both represent good news about (in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance), and since 1 + 0 > 0 for all ; is increasing in v and decreasing in F:
Under pluralistic ignorance the cuto¤ v F (y) is thus uniquely de…ned and, when interior, given as 3 0 We model here descriptive interventions, but the prescriptive case could be treated very similarly. 3 1 Examples include electricty consumption, recycling, tax compliance, etc. Ali and Bénabou (2010) analyze the "reverse"problem in which the principal seeks to learn about ; and it is the population who (at least in the aggregate) has more information about it.
3 2 Indeed, in any equilibrium de…ned by a cuto¤ v , e is what a marginal contributor brings to society, whereas the solution to (v F (y); F ) = 0: When becomes known, it shifts to the familiar v (y), which is decreasing in :
with 1 > 0: Compliance is a respectable act both prior to and following agents'learning : 0 < 0 at both v F (y) and v (y): Moreover, (i) There exists a threshold^ such that revelation increases compliance if > b and decreases it if
(ii) The higher is , that is, the better news it represents relative to the initial prior, the greater the gain (or the lower the loss) in social welfare resulting from revelation. 34
Proposition 3 characterizes the aggregate response to disclosure (which is of primary interest to the policymaker), but in doing so it likely understates the extent of heterogeneity in individual responses. In Schultz et al. [2007] , for instance, providing comparative data on electricity use led to a reduction for high consumers, but an increase for low consumers. The model provides a natural mechanism for such convergence: with 0 < 0 (energy conservation is not a heroic activity), individuals who …nd out they had overestimated the social standard feel decreased social pressure to contribute, and those who had underestimated it, increased pressure. At the same time, the dispelling of the average misperception, moving everyone in the same direction, implies that convergence cannot be a general result, and is thus not to be expected in every experiment. 35 Strategic disclosure. Consider now a principal who has some control over what agents get to learn. With probability q he receives (hard) information about ; he can then choose to reveal it, or claim that he has no such data (which occurs with probability 1 q). Upon disclosure, the cuto¤ for participation is again v (y): In the absence of disclosure it is v F (y); de…ned by
whereF ( ) denotes the distribution of conditional on non-disclosure. Given the above-noted properties of ; (18) uniquely de…nes v F (y) (when interior), and this cuto¤ is increasing inF :
Because greater participation always increase social welfare, the principal discloses if and only
is decreasing in ; this occurs for greater than some threshold~ :
Given such a "good news only" policy by the principal, …nally, agents'posterior beliefs in case of 3 4 The prior F represents agents'(common) belief about before each one learns his own v; drawn from G : Agents' beliefs at the interim stage where they know their own v are heterogenous, and also increasing (stochastically) in ; thus in general it is uncertain whether a higher also represents better news relative to these interim beliefs. Agents' participation threshold v F is independent of ; however, and therefore so is~ :
3 5 For instance, extending the model to three actions, a = 0; 1; 2; one can construct examples in which learning leads to convergence (adjustments occur from both a = 0 and a = 2 towards a = 1); or on the contrary causes divergence (adjustments from a = 1 to both extremes).
3 6 This is formally shown as part of the proof of Proposition 4.
15 non-disclosure areF
An equilibrium therefore corresponds to a~ that solves the …xed-point equation
Proposition 4 (strategic revelation) (i) The principal discloses good news and conceals bad ones: there exists a cuto¤~ 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) such that disclosure occurs if and only if ~ :
(ii) In any stable equilibrium, there is more disclosure (~ decreases), the higher q is.
(iii) For ~ ; the principal would have been strictly better o¤ under a commitment to disclose.
The second part of the proposition illustrates the credibility problem resulting from discretionary disclosure. When e ; with probability q the principal has the information to prove it, so the outcome is the same as under a commitment to disclose. With probability 1 q he does not have such proof available, so agents' beliefs are described by F~ ; which is dominated by F and thus yields lower compliance, making the principal strictly worse o¤. Achieving or enhancing credibility requires, as usual, some form of costly signaling, to which we shall turn in the next section.
Pluralistic ignorance and "social proof". In what precedes, the aggregate preference shock and average behavior a have the same informational content, so it is equivalent for the principal to disclose one or the other, and important that agents do not observe a on their own (at least, not as well as the principal). While such is indeed the case for behaviors such as electricity consumption, air pollution or tax evasion, in other instances such as drinking by student peers, shirking by co-workers or the expression of prejudice against women and minorities, people will have frequent and fairly good observations of the norm. Part of the idea of pluralistic ignorance however, is that "social proof" (equilibrium behavior a) can be a misleading guide to the true underlying group preference ( ); because individuals have trouble parsing out the contribution of perceived social pressure to the observed outcome.
There are two ways to accommodate this more "resilient" form of pluralistic ignorance. First, both and may be subject to aggregate shocks, leading to a signal-extraction problem in interpreting a: 37 Alternatively, pooling can also make a imperfectly informative, thereby restoring the scope for a principal's disclosures (strategic or not) to a¤ect agents' perceptions of ; and hence their behavior. For instance, relaxing the assumptions of continuously distributed and interior participation cuto¤, let take value L or H ; such that: (i) when agents know that = H (respectively, = L ) there is positive participation, 0 < a 1 (respectively, zero participation; a = 0); (ii) the prior probability that = L is high enough that, when agents are uninformed, no one contributing remains the (generically unique) equilibrium. 38 Thus, pluralistic ignorance prevails when agents observe a = 0; and dispelling it by (credibly) disclosing that = H increases participation.
4 The expressive function of law
Law and societal values
Empirical evidence. The idea that the law is more than a set of prices but also serves to convey a society's norms of behavior has long been discussed in the legal literature, albeit mostly in the form of thought experiments and debates over the symbolic content of legislations on sexual behavior, drinking or smoking in public, religious displays, ‡ag-burning, etc. More recent work brings two types of empirical evidence to bear on the issue.
The …rst one documents the e¤ectiveness of "symbolic"…nes or sanctions -incentives too small to matter through the standard price channel, but which signi…cantly raise compliance when combined with a simple statement or reminder of one's moral duty. Funk (2007) shows that the repeal of mandatory-voting laws in Switzerland led to statistically signi…cant declines in turnout in cantons where the law had stipulated a trivial …ne (about 1 Euro) for non-voters, whereas it had no impact where the mandate was purely declarative. Similar results are demonstrated by Galbiati and Vertova (2008) in a public-goods experiment. Stating an "obligation"to contribute above some minimum has only a weak e¤ect, and "non-binding" incentives (…nes small enough that complete free-riding remains a dominant strategy for material payo¤s) have none. When the two are combined, however, contributions double, and about half of this impact operates through a shift in subjects'beliefs about what others will give.
These …ndings suggest a signaling role of incentives (at least as perceived by subjects), and a second set of papers speci…cally document such a mechanism. Tyran and Feld (2006) show that "mild law"-penalties insu¢ cient to deter free-riding-has no e¤ect when it is exogenously imposed in a public-goods game, but signi…cantly raises compliance when endogenously chosen through an initial vote by the participants. Belief change is again a key element, as more votes favoring mild sanctions lead agents to expect higher compliance by others, and these expectations largely explain contributions levels (between conditions and subjects). In Galbiati et al. (2010) , a pair of players engaged in a coordination (minimum-e¤ort) game may be provided with substantial incentives. When these are exogenously imposed by the experimenter, they lead to increased e¤ort and expectations that the partner will also respond by contributing more. When they are endogenously imposed by a benevolent third party who has observed the pair's behavior in a previous round, in contrast, subjects who had provided high e¤ort become pessimistic about their 3 8 When dealing with corner equilbria, we restrict attention to those satisfying the D1 criterion.
partner's contribution and accordingly reduce their own, making the sanctions counterproductive. 39 Bremzeny et al. [2011] also test and con…rm the "bad news e¤ects" of choosing strong incentives, this time in a setting where the principal has private information about the di¢ culty of the (single) agent's task.
Modeling expressive law.
In what follows, we formalize the expressive content of (optimal)
incentives in the presence of norms, or reputational payo¤s more generally. We investigate in particular a question on which neither the legal literature nor existing experiments o¤er consistent insights: when should expressive concerns make the law milder, or on the contrary tougher?
When a legislator or principal with privileged information about "community standards"
or compliance a sets material incentives -law, rewards, penalties-these will inevitably convey a message about those standards, and thereby shape agents' understanding of prevailing social norms. Formally, the model will now involve two-sided signaling: agents signal their idiosyncratic types,while the principal signals the aggregate state of societal preferences. 40 For simplicity, let be perfectly known by the principal. 41 Agents only know that it lies in some subinterval ( 1 ; 2 ) of with 1 > 0 (a = 1 is then a "respectable" behavior); or, alternatively, that it lies in some ( 1 ; 2 ) with 2 < 0 ("admirable"behavior). Technically, this "one-sidedsupport"restriction is made necessary by the non-monotonic nature of the policy under symmetric information, which implies that a separating equilibrium cannot exist over all :
We look for a separating equilibrium where the planner's policy y AI ( ) is strictly increasing on if that interval lies to the left of 0 ; and strictly decreasing if it lies to the right. Agents can then invert the policy and infer the true as the unique solution^ (y) 2 to y AI (^ (y)) y: The resulting cuto¤ (here again assumed interior) is then v ^ (y) (y); so the planner maximizes 42
Provided W AI is quasiconcave in y for all and (which holds for small enough), the optimum 3 9 The source of complementarity is here the nature of agents' payo¤s, whereas in our model it is the reputationbased social norm (when 0 < 0). The common and key elements are the choice of incentives by an informed principal and agents'inferences from it about how others are likely to act. 4 0 As in Bénabou and Tirole [2003] , Ellingsen and Johannesson [2008] and Herold [2010] there is an informedprincipal problem, but now the feature of the "task"which agents try to infer -the social pressure (v )-embodies everyone's equilibrium actions and beliefs. In Sliwka [2008] and van der Weele [2008] incentives also convey information about the distribution of preferences but the nature of normative in ‡uences is quite di¤erent. In Sliwka [2008] social complementarities operate through "conformist" types, whose preference is to mimic whatever action the majority chooses. In van der Weele [2008] they involve "reciprocal altruists", whose taste for contributing to a public good rises with aggregate contributions (v is increasing in a): Our model has no built-in complementarity; conformity ( 0 < 0) or distinction ( 0 > 0) e¤ects arise endogenously, and we analyze expressive law in both cases. 4 1 The main simpli…cation is that, in a separating equilibrium, agents will not use their own realizations ofṽ to make inferences about ; since it is fully revealed by y:is given, on each side of 0 ; by the …rst-order condition e c y + v ^ (y) (y))
Together with the equilibrium condition^ = (y AI ) 1 ; this de…nes a …rst-order di¤erential equation
The di¤erence with (12) re ‡ects the planner's taking into account that agents will draw inferences from his policy about where societal values lie (term^ 0 = 1=y AI0 ) and the social sanctions and rewards they will face as a result (term 0 (v )). This informational multiplier, 1 0 ^ 0 , embodying the expressive content of the law, combines with the previously analyzed social multiplier,
1=
(1 + 0 ); to amplify or dampen agents'response to incentives, and therefore the optimal level of y: Once again, the case of no deadweight loss provides a useful benchmark.
Proposition 5 For = 0; the …rst-best symmetric-information solution y F B ( ) = e (c e)
remains an equilibrium on ( 1 ; 2 ); and it is the unique separating one.
Intuitively, when the …rst-best can be achieved with non-distortionary incentives there is no need to resort to the norm as a substitute, and hence no need either for any "expressiveness" in the law designed to manipulate that norm. The more realistic case > 0 requires solving the di¤erential equation (23), with y AI = y SI at the inner boundary. Because the Lipschitz conditions do not hold everywhere, we need to again take to be relatively small and impose the support restriction on described above.
Lemma 1 Let ( 1 ; 2 ) be any subinterval of with 1 > 0 (respectively, 2 < 0 ). For all below some > 0; the di¤ erential equation (23) with boundary condition y AI ( 1 ) = y SI ( 1 ) (respectively, y AI ( 2 ) = y SI ( 2 )) has a unique solution on ( 1 ; 2 ):
In the process of proving existence and uniqueness we also establish the following key properties of the equilibrium policy, illustrated on Figure 2 (bottom curve).
Proposition 6 (law expressing societal standards) (i) For all below some > 0; the equilibrium incentive y AI ( ) is strictly positive, increasing to the left of 0 , and decreasing to its right.
(ii) Whether the prosocial action is respectable or admirable ( 1 > 0 or 2 < 0 ); the principal always sets lower-powered incentives under asymmetric information, y AI ( ) < y F I ( ) for all 2 ( 1 ; 2 ); and compliance is lower.
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For a respectable activity, a lower y credibly conveys the message: "everyone does it, except the most disreputable people, who su¤er great stigma; this is why we do not need to provide strong incentives". For an admirable activity, a lower y conveys the message "the glory su¢ ces: contributors are rare heroes, who reap such social esteem that additional incentives are unnecessary". Another interesting implication is that expressive law is more responsive to changes in societal values than "standard" law, at least on average, and especially for modal acts, where both are used the most:
on both sides of 0 ; y AI and y SI start from a common value but y AI is everywhere below, so its average slope is steeper. At the initial point, in particular, y AI0 ( ) = 1; so clearly this function has (much) greater slope in a neighborhood of 1 and 2 : 43
Spillovers across spheres of behavior
What people learn or perceive concerning others'degree of prosociality or sel…shness carries over between activities, leading to spillovers in behavior, both good and bad. 44 Given such "contagion", a principal setting law or other incentives for one activity needs to take into account how this will a¤ect people's views of general societal norms, and thus their behavior in other realms. For instance, hard incentives conveying the sense that "society is rotten" (e.g., endemic corruption or tax evasion) can be damaging in the case of case of respectable activities where 0 < 0:
A simple case will convey the main insight, but it can be substantially generalized. Agents engage in two activities, a and b; both involving 0-1 decisions: ( 1)))=(y AI ) 0 ( 1) = 0: Since the numerator is strictly negative, the denominator must be in…nite. 4 4 For instance, Keizer et al. (2008) posted ‡yers (advertisements) on 77 bicycles parked along a wall and observed that the fraction of owners tossing them on the ground doubled (from one third to two thirds) after gra¢ ti had been painted on the wall. Similarly, leaving a e 5 bill sticking out of someone's mailbox, they observed that 13% of people pocketed it when the surroundings were clean, but 23% did when there was trash lying around. chooses a = 1 if v v a (y); de…ned by :
Note that v a depends on y (which only incentivizes b behavior) solely through the inferences drawn about : The government or principal maximizes
leading to the …rst-order-condition:
Under symmetric information the last term vanishes, so the …rst-best ( = 0) policy is given by v b (y) = c b e b ; hence y F B e b for all : When > 0; the Ramsey condition takes the form
which has a unique solution 0 < y SI ( ) < y F B ( )=(1 + ); decreasing in and ; as long as the hazard rate h(v) is increasing and 0 < < h (v b (0) ) e b : We shall assume both of these conditions.
Under asymmetric information the social cost of a marginal rise in y now includes, on top of the usual rents to inframarginal agents choosing b = 1; a reduction in a that arises from agents'inferring that they face a "worse" society and therefore weaker social enforcement in their a decisions. The optimal policy, taking account of these expressive spillovers, is given by y AI =^ 1 ; where^ solves the di¤erential equation
with boundary condition^ y SI ( 1 ) = 1 : For simplicity we focus on the case where, under symmetric-information, the a activity is in the respectable range, 0 (v a (y SI ( ))) < 0; and reputational pressure is insu¢ cient to ensure the …rst-best, meaning that v a (y SI ( )) > c a e a : The latter condition is ensured as long as e a satis…es (14), and the former provided that has support in some ( 1 ; 2 ) with 1 > e a e b (0); and is not too large. 45
Proposition 7 (expressive spillovers) When the socially-enforced behavior a is respectable or admirable ( 1 > 0 ); the principal sets lower-powered incentives for the incentivized action b under asymmetric information: y AI ( ) < y SI ( ) for all ; with y AI ( ) decreasing everywhere. Participation in b is lower than under full information, participation in a is unchanged (since is revealed).
These results are reminiscent of those in the multi-tasking literature, but operate through a different mechanism. The literature has emphasized the hazards associated with giving incentives in one task when they cannot also be adjusted on another, competing one. Relatedly, when some aspects of performance are unveri…able, it may be desirable to leave other, veri…able ones, unspeci…ed (see, e.g., Baker et al. (1994) , Bernheim and Whinston (1998) ). Rather than e¤ort substitution, crowding out occurs in our case through what incentives reveal about the standards of behavior to be expected in other activities.
Society' s resistance to economists'prescriptions. In nearly all countries, economists' typical message about the e¤ectiveness and desirable normative properties of incentives meets with considerable resistance. Examples includes tradeable pollution permits, …nancial incentives for students, teachers and civil servants, unemployment bene…ts that decrease over time to encourage job search, layo¤ taxes rather than regulation, markets for blood and organs, taxes rather than prohibition for drugs and prostitution, etc. While misinformation and special-interest considerations may be relevant in some cases, they do not come close to explaining the nearly universal reluctance toward what many in the lay public perceive as a nefarious "commodi…cation" of human activity.
Our framework can be used to shed some light on this phenomenon. Economists typically bring a message, both positive (based on empirical studies) and normative (policy recommendations) that is bad news about human nature and behavior. In terms of the model, policies implementing the standard advice to "put a price on everything" constitute strong public signals (and daily reminders) that altruism is generally low (a low ), and greed generally high. 46 Society may then resist such a message and the policies embodying it, for two reasons.
First, individuals and societies alike often just do not like to hear bad news, preferring to maintain pleasant (but ultimately, costly) illusions about themselves. Such is the case, for instance, with political and economic ideologies, national founding "myths", etc. 47 A related form of purely a¤ect-driven preference for collective self-image will be analyzed in the next section.
Second, societies could be justi…ably concerned about spillovers from policies that express too dim or mercantile a view of human nature. For instance, economists' lessons may be drawn predominantly from b -type behaviors, where incentives are easily available and social norms weak.
Less attention might be paid -perhaps simply for lack of data-to a -type behaviors, in which incentives are unavailable and reliance on social norms important. 48 As shown above, in such cases 4 6 See footnote 8 for a more general version of the model in which agents di¤er in their marginal utility of money vy: The distribution of vy can then also be subject to aggregate uncertainty, and thus revealed by policy.
4 7 For models of the persistence of collective ideologies through (equilibrium) cognitive dissonance, see Bénabou and Tirole [2006b] and Bénabou [2008] .
4 8 Note the striking contrast between economists'typical …ndings and message to society of " and are lower than 22 bringing bad news about ; by stating and especially by concretely signaling that strong incentives are e¤ective or needed in b, has the collateral e¤ect of undermining the social norms in a: This creates a need for incentives to replace them, but the nature of the activity can make this a much less cost-e¤ective way of achieving compliance, resulting in a welfare loss.
When expressiveness makes law tougher
We have so far seen how expressive concerns about the nature of society (others' goodness or mediocrity) always makes, perhaps surprisingly, the law more gentle. So when do signaling considerations lead instead to stronger incentives (along the lines of "lock them up and throw away the key: we need to send a message")?
Intuition suggests that this should occur when uncertainty bears on how damageable to society sel…sh behavior is -or, conversely, on how important the social spillovers (e) from good behavior are. Also required, however, are preferences linking agents'intrinsic motivations, v, to the social value of their contribution, e: 49 Since such a link does seem intuitive, we now consider a variant of the model in which intrinsic utilities are v a = ve; with v G(v) and G( ) having the same properties as before. 50 Reputation (or self-image) still bears on v; which represents an agent's general degree of social concern. Agents know their own v; while the principal knows e -e.g., how damaging to the environment CO 2 emissions are, how much good $1 can do in poor countries, the negative externalities created by drunk driving, drugs, etc.
Under symmetric information, the cuto¤ is now given by ev e (y) c + y + (v e (y)) 0; leading again to a modi…ed version of Pigovian taxation. Thus, for = 0;
In general, it could be the case that y F B < 0 (people demonstrate great social concern by paying signi…cant costs for trivially small social bene…ts), or that dy F B =de < 0 (reputation increases more than 1 for 1 with e, hence also the reputation tax). We shall abstract from such cases, as we are interested in relatively large e's. 51
Under asymmetric information we look for a separating equilibrium on the support [e 1 ; e 2 ] of e such that y AI (e) is increasing everywhere, as are y F B (e) and y SI (e): Agents then infer e as the solution to y AI (ê(y)) y, so the participation cuto¤ is v ê(y) (y); with most people think", leading to a prescription for incentives; and those of social psychologists working on norms-based interventions, which are that " and are higher than most people think" (pessimistic pluralistic ignorance). 4 9 Otherwise, learning from y that e is high (say) has no impact on the reputational pressure that agents face; once the direct impact of y on v is accounted for; see (5).
5 0 In small-group interactions, such a link is consistent with (and follows from) "pure", consequentialist altruism: an individual values the di¤erence he makes to e a: With large numbers, it is not, since each individual has a negligible e¤ect. Intrinsic motivation must then arise from a pure preference for ("joy of") giving. Nonetheless, it remains sensible that one should derive more intrinsic utility from giving to more useful causes, rather than unimportant ones. In particular, this is what will arise from a Kantian-type or similar rule-based reasoning.
5 1 Thus (14) su¢ ces to ensure y F B > 0 and , since 0 is bounded, a low enough ensures that dy F B =de > 0: For small enough, these properties remain true for the full information second-best policy, y F I (e):
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Figure 3: law and social externalities dv ê(y) (y)
Knowing this, the principal maximizes
leading to the di¤erential equation inê(y) 0
or, conversely, in y AI (e) :
e 1 + v e (y AI (e)) c y AI (e) e + 0 (v e (y AI (e)))
with boundary condition y AI (e 1 ) = y SI (e 1 ): Since y SI (e) is increasing we expect that for small, so is y AI (e); implying that the "expressive"term v ê(y) (y)ê 0 (y) has the sign opposite to that obtained in (22) for signaling over : These intuitions lead to the following results, illustrated in Figure 3 .
Proposition 8 (law expressing externalities) Whether the prosocial action is respectable or admirable, for all > 0 below some > 0; the principal sets higher-powered incentives under asymmetric information: y AI (e) > y SI (e) for all e; and participation is correspondingly higher.
The function y AI (e) is everywhere increasing on [e 1 ; e 2 ]: 24
Cruel and unusual punishments
As legal sanctions for antisocial behavior (harm to others, negative externalities), standard social-welfare considerations generally argue for using …nes, compensation of victims, community service and other "e¢ cient" punishments. Such alternatives are, however, politically unpopular:
large fractions of the electorate demand not only long and harsh prison sentences but also various forms of public humiliation. 52 In many countries, public executions and corporal punishments are still the law of the land and, when public, heavily attended. 53 At the same time, a growing number of nations are renouncing what they deem "cruel and unusual"punishments or means of coercion. 54
Such decisions, moreover, are not based on any real considerations of optimal deterrence, but on "what it makes us", what "civilized"peoples do or don't do -in other words, on expressive reasons.
What exactly is it, however, that makes caning, whipping, ‡ogging, public shaming and the like qualitatively di¤erent -and "expressively" worse-than very long prison sentences or drastic …nancial penalties, especially when the condemned himself would rather take the pain or shame?
The key variable in the answer we develop here could be called "the banality of evil": a fraction (for "cruel") of agents in society actually enjoy the su¤ering of others (either all others, or only the guilty, in which case this is a taste for vengeance). Seeing criminals, cheaters and other law-breakers punished harshly -a high level of physical or psychological pain, p-and publicly (being a spectator enhances this form of "consumption") is an opportunity, and possibly an excuse, to obtain such enjoyment. The total utility ‡ow thus derived is then pG (v (p)), where v (p) is the threshold below which people break the law and are subject (with some probability) to the punishment p:
The second important assumption is that many people do not like to think -…nd scary, disturbing to acknowledge-that their society or community comprises a lot of cruel or vengeful types. These could, for instance, hurt them in certain circumstances (tra¢ c dispute, breakdown of law and order, etc.). Bad news about human nature is also, inevitably, bad news about oneself. We shall assume here a simple (linear) a¤ective dislike for ugly truths about the banality of evil: agent's utility functions are now U E [ j p] ; with U still given by (1) and measuring the intensity of preferences over beliefs about 2
The government or legislator knows more about -having access to observations from the judicial system, prison life, how people behave in blackouts, wars, etc. With such knowledge it sets the level p = p( ) of "painful" penalties levied on those who choose a = 0 in serious o¤ences such as murder, theft, fraud, drunk driving, child abuse, etc. We make p here the only policy tool, but one could also allow for "non-cruel" incentives y such as …nes, jail time, community service, etc.
The key points should be unchanged, as these do not generate as much enjoyment for cruel types, and are also more costly. In setting policy, let 0 < 1 be the weight placed on the utility of the cruel types -or equivalently, their political in ‡uence. 56 Finally, the in ‡iction of harsh punishments involves direct enforcement costs, represented by a unit shadow cost 0:
Given a level of harshness p; agents infer as the solution^ (p) to p(^ (p)) = p: The cuto¤ between law-abiding and law-breaking is then determined by v (p) c + p + (v (p)) = 0; and the planner maximizes
The combined optimality and equilibrium conditions now yield
Under symmetric information, or in the absence of expressive considerations ( = 0); we get back the case of Section 4.1, with 0 : Under asymmetric information, p AI ( ) is given by (34) with the boundary condition p AI ( 1 ) = p F I ( 1 ):
Proposition 9 (civilized punishments) Let eg(c e)=G(c e) < 1: For all below some > 0 and all such that j j is below some > 0;
(i) The symmetric-information policy p F I ( ) and its asymmetric-information counterpart p AI ( ) are both increasing in :
(ii) Punishments are less harsh under asymmetric information than under full information:
and compliance is correspondingly lower.
Implications. The presence of -types reduces the e¤ective deadweight loss from punishment (to the extent that society internalizes their utility), from to : This implies harsher sanctions, closer to or in excess of …rst-best deterrence level ( = 0): On the other hand, people's desire to believe, or signify to the world, that they are part of a non-barbaric society leads to restrictions on cruel punishments, whether or not e¢ cient at the margin (above or below the …rst-best). This is captured by the last term in (34), which distinguishes such punishments from standard incentives. To the extent that cruel types'enjoyment is enhanced by witnessing harsh treatments being administered, expressive concerns will also -and …rst of all-lead to eliminating public displays of judicially sanctioned pain and executions. Indeed, much of what goes on in prisons is more cruel than some forms of corporal punishments or public shaming, but it remains out of sight. 57 5 6 Equivalently, uncertainty could be over the political weight of cruel types, rather than their number : Only the product matters. 5 7 Note also that -here as in previous cases-the equilibrium is separating, so ultimately no one is fooled and 26 5 Robustness and extensions Action space. The zero-one assumption yields very sharp results concerning the shape or equilibrium reputations and optimal incentives. The underlying insights are much more general, however. With several discrete actions, for instance, there will be multiple reputation levels corresponding to successive intervals of v; but the pursuit of reputation will remain a zero-sum gam and be re ‡ected in a nonlinear tax embodied in the optimal incentive. Reputation levels will again change with shifts in the distribution of preferences, leading to a scope for norm manipulation and expressive law. In particular, whenever the principal has private information about any parameter directly a¤ecting equilibrium reputations he will weaken incentives, so as to economize on their cost, by signaling that social payo¤s are high. This remains true even with continuous actions, as long as preference heterogeneity is multidimensional (e.g., prosocial motivation and utility for money, or prosocial motivation and image concerns), so that behavior remains an imperfect signal of type. 58 Reputational payo¤s. Most of the paper's results were derived under the joint assumption 1 : Actions are therefore strategic complements when F is concave (f is decreasing), which by de…nition means that G is more concave than ' (e.g., g is decreasing and ' is convex). Conversely, they are strategic substitutes when G is more convex than ':
Similarly, f is single-peaked if G is more convex than ' up to a point, then more concave. 59 The analysis of optimal incentives under symmetric or asymmetric information then proceeds along lines qualitatively similar to those of the paper, albeit with more complicated expressions.
These observations allow the global monotonicity or single-peakedness of equilibrium reputation and optimal incentives to be preserved for certain more general payo¤ speci…cations. Even when they are not, however, it is important to note that the paper's key results do not strictly average welfare would be higher (more generally, the principal would be better o¤ ex-ante) if he could commit to acting according to the truth, whether pleasant or not, about human nature. This is a standard type of ine¢ cientsignaling result, but it also re ‡ects speci…c assumptions that one may want to relax. Thus, with discrete types there could be pooling equilibria; ignorance could then generate (ex-ante) welfare gains if agents' utility is concave in^ ; or if increasing returns in cooperative investments make social payo¤s nonlinear in trust. Alternatively, a fraction of agents may be naifs rather than perfect Bayesians. 5 8 For agents'equilibrium behavior and reputations in such a model (with an exogenously given level of incentives), see Bénabou and Tirole [2006a] . In this continuous speci…cation the mean of the preference distribution (the v's) no longer a¤ects reputations, but its variances and covariances do (as does the mean of agents' 's). 
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require such global properties. Proposition 2 applies whatever is the shape of g and thus ; and Propositions 2 and 6 apply on any interval of or e such that 0 (v ) remains bounded away from zero. Furthermore, whereas the size of the multiplier and the direction in which a principal wants to strategically bias his disclosures hinge on the sign of 0 ; our results about when expressive concerns lead to weaker or tougher laws (Propositions 6 and 8) are entirely independent of it.
They would thus also carry over to most other forms of reputational payo¤s, including for instance non-monotonic "preferences for conformity" as in Bernheim [1994] .
The scope of norms. While we do not explicitly model the enforcement of social sanctions and rewards that typically underlie reputational payo¤s, one can already identify several intuitive factors that will also contribute to the emergence of norms ( 0 < 0) or a quest for distinction ( 0 > 0): A …rst one is asymmetry in the feasibility of social rewards and punishments. In most public-goods experiments, for instance, agents can punish free-riders but not reward model citizens.
This perhaps re ‡ects the fact that, in many decentralized interactions, it is cheaper to hurt than to reward someone (at the same monetary or utility-equivalent level). In such cases the socially enforced payo¤ reduces to M (v); leading to unmitigated complementarity and strong norms.
The same e¤ect obtains when good actions may be unrelated to type (false positives) with some probability, while conversely the existence of plausible but unveri…able excuses for not contributing weakens the inferences that can be drawn from it, thus dampening stigma relative to honor. 60 Next, when agents are more concerned about a given behavior (say, a¤ecting the environment), they tend to pay more attention to how others behave along this dimension, and to be more willing to enforce social sanctions on them. By making increasing in ; this will cause optimal incentives to decline faster (or, where 0 > 0; increase slower) with average societal concerns, and thus further amplify the "bad news" about average preferences expressed by strong incentives. Finally, participating more in some behavior, such as volunteering or …ghting for one's group, can make it easier to observe who else does so. In this case depends positively on a; resulting in a larger social multiplier and a greater likelihood that powerful social norms will emerge, but again with a qualitatively similar impact on how optimal incentives vary with societal preferences.
Individual and social preferences. We have assumed that agents try to signal their commitment (v) to a speci…c cause -environment, …rm, country-to an audience that cares about it. In other contexts, they could instead signal a broader concern for welfare. For example, an individual with type v, instead of internalizing ve where e is the externality, could also have concern for taxpayers's costs and thus internalize v[e (1 + )y]: Stocking [2011] provides experimental evidence that agents take into account the "eviction e¤ect" of receiving an incentive. Relatedly, De¤ains and Fluet [2010] consider strict liability law, which forces harm-doers to fully compensate their victims; this is similar to y = e (and implicitly assumes = 0): The individual experiences no moral disutility since the victim is made whole (zero net externality); as a result, there is no reputational e¤ect either, since behavior becomes uncorrelated with concern for others. 61 With realistic transaction or enforcement costs, however, strict liability will be suboptimal, thus bringing back reputation and the interactions of laws and norms.
It could also be the principal who has di¤erent preferences. First, the case where he puts a weight less than one on agents'total welfare and derives private bene…ts from their contributions can be renormalized into a planner's problem (see Section 1.1). Second, a social planner could value di¤erently the material welfare of agents with di¤erent types, or those of contributors and abstainers. This corresponds to an objective function of the form such that @ 2 =@v @ = 0 where @ =@v = 0 -satis…ed, in particular, by (35) . We show in the Appendix that (under appropriate regularity conditions) the key result on expressive content over leading to weaker incentives no matter whether @v =@^ < 0 (corresponding to complementarity) or @v =@^ > 0 (substitutability) will again hold in any separating equilibrium.
Conclusion
The paper's main results can be summarized by two multipliers: a social multiplier, measuring how reputational payo¤s depend on the frequency of di¤erent behaviors in the population, and an informational multiplier, re ‡ecting how perceptions of societal preferences and prevailing norms are a¤ected by the policies of an informed principal. Optimal incentives take both into account, resulting in two departures from standard Pigou-Ramsey taxation. First, because incentives are shown to generate crowding out for rare, heroic behaviors but crowding-in for common, merely respectable ones, their optimal level depends (nonmonotonically) on the private cost of the behavior and the distribution of intrinsic motivations in society, neither of which plays a role in the standard Pigovian rule. Second, expressive concerns always lead to weaker incentives when the principal's information involves the general "goodness"of society (more generally, the strength of social norms), and to stronger ones when it concerns the spillovers created by agents'behavior.
There are several directions in which our analysis could be interestingly expanded. First, we have taken the distribution of preferences as exogenous. This is a good approximation when the population is …xed, such as for a country. By contrast, a …rm may choose to segregate workers with heterogeneous values into sub-units where di¤erent norms will prevail, and likewise for a school with its students. There can also be self-sorting through cooptation and exit in organizations, or through migration across neighborhoods and regions. Extending the model to deal with segregation -both equilibrium and optimal-could thus shed light on local variations in norms and institutions.
Second, the coevolution of norms, law, and the social meaning of private and public actions, o¤ers a vast and promising topic for future research. 62
Appendix
Properties of the function. Recall that is minimized at v = 0 (by normalization of the v's) and that we strengthened the quasiconcavity implied by the second part of Lemma 1 to assume that it is strictly decreasing on [v min ; 0] and strictly increasing on [0; v max ]: This implies that for any small" > 0;there exists (") > 0 such that
so j 0 j is clearly bounded on (v min ; v max ): At the boundaries, l'Hopital's rule yields 0 (v min ) =
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) Let us express (12) as F (y SI ( ); ) = 0; where
with all functions in the bracketed term evaluated at v (y) = + v 0 (y + ): Since h is strictly positive and continuously di¤erentiable (C 1 ) everywhere, so is F , with
Since h and have continuous derivatives, the function (v) is bounded on V:
when this number is positive and 1 = +1 otherwise. Thus, F (y; ) is strictly decreasing in y whenever < 1 : Next, observe that for y = y F B ( ) the non-bracketed terms in (A.2) sum to zero, so F (y F B ( ); ) < 0 for all : We also have
or equivalently by (5) and the identity v (0) = v 0 ( ) : .5) and for < min f 1 ; 2 g the function F ( ; ) has a (unique) zero y SI ( ) 2 (0; y F B ( )): q (ii) We focus here on the case 1 > 0 ; and denote " 1 1 0 ; the case with 2 < 0 can be treated symmetrically. By the implicit function theorem,
We next show that that 0 (v (y SI ( ))) is negative and bounded away from zero on ( 1 ; 2 ): First, note that
Fix " 00 with " 00 < 1 0 and de…ne
Since y SI ( ) < y F B ( ) < e; when < min f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g ; v (y SI ; ) < " 0 for all in ( 1 ; 2 ):
, we have by (8) 0 c e > v min + "; so there exists 4 2 (0; 3 ) such that for all < 4 ; v (y SI ; ) > v min + "=2: Denoting " 0 minf" 00 ; "=2g; and 0 (" 0 );
property (A.1) therefore implies that
Finally, let us de…ne
Thus, for < min f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 g ; (@F=@y)(y SI ( ); ) < 0 and (A.6) implies that y SI ( ) is strictly decreasing on ( 1 ; 2 ): We shall denote F I (y) its inverse function.
Proof of Proposition 4 We …rst verify that the principal discloses if and only if
Indeed, in that case disclosure leads to a welfare gain of
by (16), whereas when v (y) > v nd (y) it generates a loss of
due to the same condition.
We next analyze the …xed-point problem (20). Since F~ is decreasing in 1 q and in~ ; so is v F~ (y); by (18): a lack of disclosure is better news (and therefore leads to more participation) the less likely it is that the principal has information, and the more selective his disclosure policy.
Consequently, the right-hand side of (20) Agents thus correctly infer ; and the participation cuto¤ is v (y AI ( )) v (e (c e)) = c e + (c e) (c e) = c e:
Therefore, for all ; @W AI =@y = 0 for y = e (c e): Strict quasiconcavity then implies that this is the optimal policy under asymmetric information when the planner observes that value :
To show uniqueness, let y( ) be some other function that equates the left-hand side of (23) 
, and as any separating equilibrium it must also satisfy the boundary condition y( 1 ) = y SI ( 1 ) = y F B ( 1 ): Since 0 has bounded derivatives, standard standard theorems ensure that the solutions to this initial-value problem is unique. Note, however, that y F B ( ) = e (c e) satis…es that same di¤erential equation and coincides with y( ) at the boundary. Therefore, the two must be equal.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 6 Fix ( 1 ; 2 ) ; with 0 < 1 ; and again denote " 1 1 0 > 0: The case 2 < 0 can be treated symmetrically. By Proposition 2, for < there exists a decreasing function (which depends on ) y SI :
that solves the full-information problem, F (y SI ( ); ) = 0: Step 1: local existence and uniqueness. The function (y; ) and its partial derivatives are well-de…ned and continuous at every point where the denominator terms, e c y + v (y) and 0 (v (y) ), are non-zero. In particular, at (y 1 ; 1 ) = (y SI ( 1 ); 1 ) we have e c y 1 +v 1 (y 1 ) > 0 due to (15). Moreover, (A.9) implies that, at = 1 ; 0 Step 2: properties of the solution. Fix any " 0 such that h( " 0 ) > 0 and .13) and de…ne
Lemma 2 For all < ; the function^ has the following properties on its support:
(i) b(y) e c y +v(y) is strictly decreasing, and therefore bounded below by b(y 1 ) > 0:
(ii)v(y) ^ (y) is bounded above by " 0 ; implying in particular 0 (v(y) ^ (y)) < 0: (ii) Note …rst that:
Suppose now that (ii) does not hold, and let y 0 be the largest y 2 [ỹ ; y 1 ] such thatv(y) ^ (y) = " 0 :
The bracketed term in (A.15)is therefore positive, and since 0 (v ^ (y 0 ) (y 0 ) ^ (y 0 )) = 0 ( " 0 ) < 0 this implies that the functionv(y) ^ (y) is increasing at y 0 : Since at y 1 it is strictly below " 0 by (A.13), there must exists some y 00 2 (y 0 ; y 1 ) where it equals " 'again, a contradiction. k Lemma 3 For all < :
(i) Wherever^ (y) lies below F I (y) (respectively, above it) on [ỹ ; y 1 ];^ must be decreasing (respectively, increasing).
(ii) Consequently, the two curves intersect only at y 1 ;^ lies everywhere below F I ; and the function (y) is strictly decreasing.
(iii) Compliance is strictly lower under asymmetric information. (ii) Where the two curves intersect, the above inequalities must all be equalities, and in particular it must be that^ 0 (y) = 0: Since F I is a decreasing function,^ 0 (y 1 ) = 0 > ( F I ) 0 (y 1 ); so just to the left of y 1 ;^ (y) lies below the decreasing curve F I (y): It cannot cut it elsewhere, since at any such intersection^ would have to be steeper than F I ; while at the same time having a horizontal derivative, a contradiction. The last part of the claim follows from (i).
(iii) and (iv) From (9), we havev(y) ^ (y) = v (y +^ (y)) > v (y + AI (y)) > v (y + F B (y)) = c e > v min + "; where the …rst inequality (establishing (iii)) follows from (ii) above, the second from the fact that y SI ( ) < y F B ( ) for all ; and the last one from (8) together with " 0 < ". In Lemma 2 we showed thatv(y) ^ (y) is bounded above by " 0 ; so we now have both parts of (A.1), implying the last claim in (iv). k
Step 3: existence and uniqueness of a global solution for y AI on ( 1 ; 2 ). De…ning y 2 ỹ the inverse function y AI ^ 1 concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Given the assumptions made following (27), the function (y; ) y+
is then increasing in y; and ; with (0; ) < 0; or < (e b = (1 + ) ; ):
Hence y SI ( ) is uniquely de…ned and decreasing in and , with 0 < y SI ( ) < y F B ( )=(1 + ):
Turning now to the di¤erential equation ( Consider the initial-value problem de…ned by (A.19) and the initial condition^ (y 1 ) = F I (y 1 ), where Where this last condition holds, we also know that @W F I (y) =@y > 0 and, by quasiconcavity of W F I ; we conclude that y < y SI (^ (y)); or equivalently F I (y) <^ (y) : Therefore^ (:) is decreasing if and only if F I (y) ^ (y) :
Now, observe that wherever^ (y) and F I (y) intersect, it must be that e b + v b (y) c b y = 36 =h (v b (y)) ; and consequently^ 0 = 0 at the intersection point. Such is the case at the initial point y 1 F I ( 1 ); therefore^ 0 (y) > F I 0 (y) and^ (y) > F I (y) on some left-neighborhood of y 1 : Suppose the two curves intersect at more than one point, and let z < y be the largest such intersection. At that point^ must cut F I from above, meaning that^ 0 (y ) < F I 0 (y ) < 0;
which contradicts the fact that^ 0 (y ) = 0: Therefore the two curves intersect only at y 1 , implying that^ (y) > F I (y) and^ 0 < 0 on (y 2 ; y 1 ]. Equivalently, y AI ^ 1 is decreasing on [ 1 ; 2 ]; and y AI ( ) y SI ( ) with strict inequality except at 1:
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof follows steps very similar to those used for Proposition 6; it is omitted to avoid repetition and economize on space, but is available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 9. We will show the claimed properties of the symmetric-information solution p F I ( ) for = 0; in which case v (p) = c p: By continuity, they extend to small enough. The …rst derivative is negative as long as 0 j1 + k 0 (p c)j < 1; which holds for not too large since k 0 is bounded from below (as g > 0 on [v min ; v max ]: The second derivative is also negative provided p < k (c p) ; for 0 > 0 this holds at p = p F I ( 0 ) if and only if e > p; meaning that (e; 0 ) < 0; or e < k(c e); for 0 < 0 it holds if and only if e < p; meaning that (e; 0 ) > 0; or again e < k(c e): Since we assumed that eg(c e)=G(c e) < 1 (which can be ensured, for instance, as long as eg(v max ) < 1), this condition holds as well. Consequently, for 0 j1 + k 0 (p c)j < 1;
the implicit function theorem ensures that p F I ( 0 ) is strictly increasing in 0 :
Consider now the case of asymmetric information. The di¤erential equation (34) Proof for Section 5. We provide here the key arguments in the proof relative to expressive content over under the more general objective function and threshold rules introduced at the end of Section 5. Since our objective is only to show the robustness of the key insight, we simply take as given the existence and di¤erentiability of the relevant solutions (but these could be established as they were for previous propositions).
Denoting^ (y) the value of which agents will infer (in a separating equilibrium) from his choice of y; the principal maximizes over y it follows that (dy AI =d ) (@v =@y) < 0; hence the result.
